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SOME DICTA ON DISCRIMINATION'
by Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas
Man, being filled with intense likes and dislikes, seems to have an
infinite capacity for discrimination. This is a condition that is not
peculiar to the United States. Wherever one travels he finds laws, regu-
lations, and customs that prefer some people over others.
In the Philippines, the Chinese are put under great handicaps when
it comes to the retail trade. Naturalization in that country is very
onerous for people of that race. Throughout Southeast Asia one finds
laws and regulations that limit the trade or occupation in which mem-
bers of the Chinese race may lawfully participate. Some limit the
public offices that the Chinese can hold.
India, burdened with the problem of the Untouchables, has strived
mightily to remedy their inequalities. But the villages of India still
reflect a 17th century attitude rather than the more enlightened 20th
century philosophy.
Kashmir is symbolic of the folly of trying to divide a nation on re-
ligious grounds.
In some Moslem countries, the Christian is under great disabilities.
In the Middle East, the Jew is often singled out for special treatment.
I remember one country where a Jew must mark his house with a dis-
tinctive symbol, pay special taxes, and suffer disability by not being
eligible for service in the army.
Iraq and Turkey in particular practice rank discrimination against
the Kurd. Communist regimes harbor discriminatory attitudes in their
rules and regulations although often they are disguised.
Those who applaud the regime enjoy security both in Russia and in
Formosa. But in each the dissident faces trial and possible banish-
ment or imprisonment. As recently stated in the Guardian, "The tiny
minority of critical thinkers in Soviet society is almost obliterated by the
twin pressures of conformist passivity from below and repression from
above."
The landlord in Latin America gets "justice" in the courts. But there,
as in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the sharecropper gets only the
1 These remarks were delivered at the Loyola University School of Law in Los
Angeles, California, on February 11, 1970.
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rough back of the hand.
Race, religion, economic status, ideology, and beliefs are often the
reason for discrimination the world over.
Africa knows discrimination apart from Rhodesia and South Africa.
The best witnesses to that are perhaps the Indians and Pakistanis who
feel the harsh hand of Africanization. I remember one place in East
Africa where I, a Christian, could not stay overnight because tradition
and custom dictated that no Christian should sleep there-an attitude
reminiscent of some towns in east Tennessee where the boast was that
no Black had ever stayed there after the sun set.
I hasten to add that the Christians are no different from the others.
When we the Christians took Jerusalem, 75,000 people were beheaded
merely because they were infidels. When Saladin, the Kurd and great
Arab leader, retook Jerusalem 110 years later, he executed no one,
proving I guess that Saladin was the best "Christian" of all. That is
why I always lay a wreath on Saladin's tomb whenever I visit Damascus.
The main political problem throughout history has been to develop
viable societies with multi-racial, multi-religious, and multi-ideological
communities. History shows that various forms and types of prejudices
and discriminations have prevented the people of the world from making
any great progress in that direction. The greatest experiment in all of
history is here in the United States. What we do in this regard will have
vast repercussions the world around, much greater than what we do
in outer space or in other aspects of our developing technology.
Many of our constitutional provisions are aimed at the prevention of
discrimination, not generally by individuals but by the state or federal
government. The Fifteenth Amendment protecting the right to vote
bars abridgment of that right on account of "race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." The Thirteenth Amendment barring slavery
and involuntary servitude was born out of the travail of the Blacks,
although it is not restricted to them alone. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment that speaks in terms of the rights of a "person" to Due Process and
Equal Protection does not select people of any particular color or
nationality. The Nineteenth Amendment bars discrimination in voting
on the basis of sex. And the First Amendment, with its ban on laws re-
specting the "establishment of religion" or prohibiting the "free exercise"
of it and its guarantee of "freedom of speech" and "of the press," goes
far to protect the multi-religious and multi-ideological community.
Morever, the provisions in Article VI which give sanction to the affirma-
tion as well as the oath and the provision that "no religious test shall ever
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be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the
United States" help round out the guarantees of religious liberty for
which we are famous.
Due Process and Equal Protection are not defined in the Constitution.
Great arguments have taken place-indeed they are continuing ones-
over the meaning of these words. One who construes them to the dislike
of one group is accused of "legislating." Those who approve the deci-
sion call the author "farsighted" or "liberal."
A great deal of attention has recently been focused on the role of
the Supreme Court in the battle against discrimination. The Court's
work, however, varies from decade to decade. Lawyers know that the
Court does not generate its own business-that it has no roving com-
mission to investigate-that it performs no administrative functions.
The public, however, often gets the contrary view and as a result has
distorted ideas concerning the role and responsibilities of the Court.
Holmes used to say that the Court is like the oyster that clings to the
rock feeding on what by chance the tides may bring in. The tides of
American history vary and the work of the Court reflects the major
worries and concerns of the people of the time.
Although every period of Court history shows a wide variety of
problems presented in the cases on its docket, certain trends are dis-
cernible. The Marshall period is generally associated with the forging
of the various doctrines emanating from the Commerce Clause both
positive and negative, that is to say, the force of the commerce power
in the hands of Congress and its implied prohibition that bans the
exercise of power even when Congress has not acted.2 The interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause in the days of Marshall certainly helped
lay the foundation for the structure of the great common market we
have today. But, though Marshall often gets the credit, much of the
architecture followed in later years. As a matter of fact, the nadir was
probably reached in 1942 when the Court held in Wickard v. Filburn3,
that wheat never leaving the farm might nonetheless be within the
reach of the Commerce Clause. Wickard-much criticized by my
former Brother Charles Whittaker 4-was actually reaffirmed without
his dissent while he sat with us.5
The post Civil War period is generally associated with the constitu-
2 See W. RuTEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FArH 45 et seq. (1947).
3 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
4 Whittaker, A Confusion of Tongues, 51 A.B.AJ. 27, 32 (1965).
5 United States v. Haley, 358 U.S. 644 (1959).
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tional attack upon social and economic legislation in which the Bar
rather successfully employed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to great advantage. Perhaps the high-water mark was
Lochner v. New York.6 That period was roughly from 1886 to 1937.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment was inspired by the plight of the
Blacks, the first beneficiaries were the corporations. The Court held in
1886 that a corporation was a "person" within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7  It was not until
1937 that substantive Due Process went into the eclipse. Since that
time the Due Process Clause has been interpreted more restrictively, as
Holmes in his famous dissents had long pleaded.
There was a fear that, when in 1935 Colgate v. Harvey8 was decided,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would in turn be used as a refuge for business, financial, and economic
interests that desired to escape regulation. That was the great fear that
Justice Stone expressed. That fear, however, was short-lived as Colgate
v. Harvey was overruled in 1940 by Madden v. Kentucky.9
In these days, like fears are sometimes expressed that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause or once more the Due Process Clause will be converted
into an implement with which judges can strike down so-called "un-
desirable" or "unwise" legislation. I think, however, that that will not
come to pass. I think judges have a keen realization that here, as in
many other areas of the world, inequality and injustice are endemic in
society and that the resolution of these problems must be entrusted in
the main to the political processes and not to the courts.
The Equal Protection Clause is not designed to iron out all in-
equalities. It could not possibly do so even if such an effort were made.
The poor cannot be given all the advantages enjoyed by the rich.
Equality in this sense was never the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause. Its aim at most was to eliminate rank or invidious discrimina-
tion.10 Government must always classify, draw lines, and make dis-
tinctions." It is only in the rare case that equal protection is denied.
The main thrust of the work of the Court since World War II has
6 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pae. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
8 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
9 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
10 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
11 See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-10 (1969);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
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been in the field of civil fights, both at the statutory and constitutional
level.
Discrimination based upon race, creed, or color is certainly within
the ban of the Equal Protection Clause. Certainly government may
not bar a person from a school, a trade, occupation, or office because
of his race, creed, or color, or place another burden or disability on
him for such a reason. I suppose there would have been no great
uproar if in 1954 the Court had held that Jews or Catholics could not
be segregated in separate but equal public schools.
There is nothing in the Constitution about wealth or poverty, no
guarantee to save paupers from their historic fate. Neither the Con-
stitution nor the Bill of Rights refers to the Poor or to the Rich. But
paupers have the same fights as the rest of the people. So if a constitu-
tional fight is withheld or barred because of a person's economic status,
is not government administering law with an unequal hand?
And is it not an "invidious" discrimination to reserve or make easily
available the right to vote only to those with property?' 2 Or treat any
other constitutional right in such a manner?
There is another group of equal protection cases that some have felt to
be more dubious but which always seemed sound to me. They are in
the criminal field. When government undertakes prosecution of the
individual, is it not a form of unequal protection to weight the scales
against a defendant merely because he is poor?
I speak primarily of Griffin v. Illinois3 and Douglas v. California4
where records and lawyers, both necessary for meaningful appeals, were
required to be furnished to indigents in criminal cases. I also speak of
Skinner v. Oklahoma,'5 where sterilization-an extreme penalty-was
imposed on one class of offenders but not on another indistinguishable
class.
Our Constitution is not the constitution of a welfare state. It was not
designed to do things for people. It was designed to take government
off the backs of people. That meant curtailing the power of the police,
the prosecutors, the judges, the legislators, and the executive officers.
If the Constitution were amended so as to embody the welfare state
conception, then the work of the Court would radically change.
Poverty, however, is a fact of life and it casts a shadow over judicial
12 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
's 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
14 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
15 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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work apart from the instances I have mentioned.
One example concerns the guarantee of counsel contained in the
Sixth Amendment which now extends to state as well as to federal trials
in felony cases."6 It says there is a right to counsel "in all criminal prose-
cutions." That phrase cannot be meaningfully construed merely with
the help of a dictionary. It requires an interpretation that is relevant
to the conditions of life. The poverty and ignorance of many criminal
defendants emphasize the fact that the most critical part of the "criminal
prosecution" may start when the police zero in on a man, arrest him,
and hold him incommunicado for questioning. That practice is not
peculiar to America. It exists throughout the world. One of the most
notorious offenders are the Russians who provide by law that a suspect
may be held incommunicado up to six months. The criminal trials that
I have attended in the Soviet Union all concerned the question of punish-
ment, not the question of guilt, for guilt had been resolved by the investi-
gators and police during those long periods of detention incommunicado.
Many have felt that our Sixth Amendment, coupled with the Fifth
Amendment, should not be construed to produce that result. That was
the basic philosophy of Miranda v. Arizona,'7 which of course protects
the Rich as well as the Poor but came into focus as a landmark decision
because of the outstanding legal needs of the disadvantaged in our midst.
The Equal Protection Clause is aimed at governmental discrimination,
not at discrimination perpetrated by purely private acts. But many
questions have arisen as to whether or not there has been "state action"
with regard to a particular discrimination.
One category of cases involves state administrative control of private
enterprise. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,' a Negro
brought suit claiming that the refusal of a restaurant to serve him was
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The restaurant was located in
a building owned and operated by the State of Delaware as a public
automobile parking service, and the private operator of the restaurant
had leased the premises from the State. In these circumstances, the
Court held that the State was a "joint participant"'" in the discrimination.
The nexus between a state and private enterprise can take many forms.
The lessor-lessee relationship involved in Burton is one. Another is
the relationship that arises from licensing. I have had difficulty seeing
16 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Is 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19 Id. at 725.
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how a State can license a business serving the public and endow it con-
stitutionally with the authority to operate on the basis of apartheid.2"
As stated by the first Mr. Justice Harlan in dissenting in the Civil Rights
Cases in 1883:21
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and
managers of places of public amnusement are agents or instrumentalities
of the State, because they are charged with duties to the public, and are
amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to governmental
regulation. It seems to me that, within the principle settled in Ex parte
Virginia, a denial, by these instrumentalities of the State, to the citizen,
because of his race, of that equality of civil rights secured to him by
law, is a denial by the State, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If it be not, then that race is left, in respect of the civil
rights in question, practically at the mercy of corporations 'and in-
dividuals wielding power under the States.
22
The Court, however, has never decided the extent to which licensing
and other forms of state regulation of private enterprise operate, for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, to insinuate the state govern-
ment into the scheme of private activity.
Another category of cases involves acts by private individuals under
a state law requiring discrimination. Such a case was Peterson v.
Greenville,23 where ten Negroes who had seated themselves at a lunch
counter in Greenville, South Carolina, were arrested and convicted of
violating a state trespass statute, after the manager of the store where
the lunch counter was located had asked the Negroes to leave and they
had refused to do so. A Greenville city ordinance required separation
of the races in restaurants, and on this basis the Court found that the
discrimination was attributable to state action, even assuming that the
manager would have acted as he did independently of the ordinance.24
Lombard v. Louisiana,2 5 another "sit-in" case, was different in that no
state statute or city ordinance there required racial segregation in
restaurants. Both the Mayor and the Superintendent of Police, however,
had announced publicly that such "sit-in demonstrations" would not be
permitted. The Court held that these announcements were equivalent
20 See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1963) (concurring opinion);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181-85 (1961) (concurring opinion).
21 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
22 Id. at 58-59.
23 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
24 Id. at 248.
25 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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to a city ordinance, thus constituting the requisite state action.
A State need not officially require discrimination for its legislative
pronouncements to involve it in discriminatory activity carried out by
private persons. Reitman v. Mulkey, 20 for example, involved an ad-
dition to the California Constitution which expressly authorized an
individual "to decline to sell, lease or rent [real] property to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses." The United
States Supreme Court agreed with the California Supreme Court that
the effect of this new constitutional provision was not merely to repeal
several statutes recently passed by the California Legislature regulating
racial discrimination in housing, but also to establish the right to dis-
criminate as a basic state policy. Thus, this addition to the State Con-
stitution was held to involve the State in private discriminations.
Perhaps the most controversial category of cases, however, are those
in which the only relationship between the State and private acts of
discrimination is the use of the State's judicial machinery to enforce that
discrimination. Attempts to place logical limits on the doctrine of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 7 have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention.
One theory would limit Shelley to cases involving restrictive covenants
in deeds of real property on the ground that they involve a sort of
"zoning" for which the state is responsible even when perpetrated by
private persons.28 Another suggestion is that Shelley should apply to
prevent a State from enforcing a discrimination by one who does not
wish to discriminate, but should not prevent willing discrimination.29
A third approach advocates a case-by-case balancing of the claims of
liberty and property against those of equality.80
These attempts to limit Shelley stem from the fact that, without such
limitation, the opinion might be read for the proposition that a state court
cannot enforce any private discrimination if the State could not itself
make that discrimination. Such a doctrine, pushed to its logical extreme,
would mean that a court could not enforce a private will that draws a
racial line. It would mean that a court could not uphold an action of
26 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
27 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
28 See, e.g., Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLuTM. L. REv. 1083, 1115-18
(1960); cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381-87 (1967) (concurring opinion).
29 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1959); see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331
(1964) (dissenting opinion).
30 Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473 (1962).
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trespass against a white who refused to leave the property of a Black,
desiring to exclude him on the basis of his race.
The commentators may each have their pet theory, but the cases
have not yet resolved the limits of the Shelley doctrine.
Another question is the extent to which state policy may be expressed
in customs, for purposes of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
as well as in formal legislative, executive or judicial action. This idea
again dates back to the Civil Rights Cases,31 but the question has been
little explored in the cases since then.32
The federal civil rights acts have become major weapons in the
attack on discrimination. These acts draw on the full resources of
congressional power, not merely on the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the constitutionality of Title I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,3' which prohibits discrimination in motels, restaurants,
and other places of public accommodation, was sustained, not under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but under the Commerce Clause.3 4 By resting
the constitutionality of Title II on the Commerce Clause, the issue of
"state action" was avoided. But new questions as to whether a particu-
lar restaurant or motel is within the commerce definitions of the Act
or whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler were injected
instead. It was for this reason that I preferred to rest the constitutionality
of Title II on the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the Commerce
Clause.3 5
Another important civil fights statute, which lay partially dormant
for many years, is 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). This statute, which
was part of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, prohibits all racial
discrimination, private and public, in the sale and rental of property.
The congressional authority to reach the unofficial acts of private in-
dividuals by this statute was sustained under the Enabling Clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment in Jones v. Mayer Company. 6
Another statute which derives from § 1 of the 1866 Act is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1964). This statute provides that "[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right. . . to make
31 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32 See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 178-81 (1961) (concurring opinion).
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
34 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
05 379 U.S. at 279-80 (concurring opinion).
36 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1964).
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and enforce contracts. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." The
substantive terms of this broad guarantee have yet to be determined in
litigation. Does this provision apply to the contracts of private social
clubs with their members?
Many questions remain to be decided as to the scope of the federal
civil rights statutes. The significant point for present purposes is that
these congressional measures, which are designed to eradicate discrimi-
nation in our society, are not necessarily limited to governmental actions,
but can reach the actions of private individuals.
All constitutional questions aside, there is much work to be done by
the Bar in the years ahead in eliminating from the laws, as well as from
the manner of their enforcement, the bias that often is evident against
those who are poor and ignorant. Neighborhood Legal Services is sym-
bolic of the start that is being made on the problem. Revamping the
laws and the rules and regulations to eliminate bias against classes that
often appear in them, or in their application, is the challenging task
of the oncoming lawyers.
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